Howdy,
I published a short little ditty on the war in Gaza. Below is the full helping of my musings. It’s long, so bring some snacks, get into your comfy clothes, and take a read.
After 1,500 days in Iraq and Afghanistan, I’m hardwired against optimistic battlefield updates. I’ve seen rosey battlefield reports mask the actual situation. In 2006, while Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld trumpeted Operation Together Forward II, I saw the disaster firsthand. Two years later, in Afghanistan, I saw the Taliban’s rise in the rural Pashtun heartland while the DoD trumpeted its progress. In 2012, while President Obama touted his surge's success, I witnessed its meager effects in northern Kandahar. In 2020, I had front-row seats to the fall of Kabul. President Biden assured the American people that Afghan forces were capable despite my reports stating otherwise.
The only time I felt confident about any American war was in 2010. I was serving on a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Diyala’s restive province near the border with Iran. It was a microcosm of Iraq’s problems writ large: the Shia-dominated provincial government used the security forces to attack its political rivals. Regardless, a semblance of security was evident. Markets were full. Children played soccer. I even walked around in Iraq without body armor (note: I did have a platoon-size personal security detail, just in case). This is what victory looks like, I thought.
Less than three years later, the Islamic State would take Mosul, and President Obama sent troops back to Iraq–where they remain today.
No matter how much you study or experience it up close and personal, war makes fools of us all. It requires a deep sense of intellectual humility, something that is often lacking in our analysis of Israel’s war against Hamas. While I have extensive experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I have not seen the battlefield in Gaza. Even those who do tour the battlefield only catch a glimpse of what the IDF or Hamas want to show them. The fog of war is very real. In short, examining a war amid fighting is a challenging endeavor.
Nevertheless, after nearly five months of fighting, it is essential to try and take stock of the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) campaign by examining it through the lens of Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s war objectives: the destruction of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, the release of all hostages, and ensuring that Gaza never is a threat to Israelis. Although the IDF is making real progress on the battlefield, it still could lose this war politically or during the next phase of operations, which will prove just as tricky as the first.
— Hamas —-
Before examining the IDF’s performance, it is essential to examine its opponent, Hamas. I’ve spent most of my adult life fighting terrorist groups. And I’m confident in saying that nobody in the US military has squared off against an adversary like Hamas.
In Iraq, we fought both Shia extremist groups, like Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps, and Sunni groups, like Al Qaeda in Iraq and former regime elements. In Afghanistan, Americans fought a multifaceted Sunni insurgency that the Taliban led but also included Hezbe Islami Gulbuddin, The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province, and countless other groups I’ve forgotten about.
Nevertheless, I know Hamas’ type of savagery. Jaysh al-Mahdi used to cut out the intestines of the Sunnis they butchered, place an IED inside of them, sew the body back up, and put them on the side of the road, hoping that an American tasked with identifying the remains would be killed—and this trick worked all too often. The Taliban frequently murdered Afghans who were simply trying to build roads into far-off valleys. I know because they strung up some that worked for me as a warning to other villagers: the Taliban is more powerful than the Americans.
Despite my years of experience, Hamas’ brutality even shook me. It was a modern-day pogrom: gang rapes, beheadings, and the disfigurement of bodies. They are still sexually assaulting hostages in their tunnels. They are murdering them. We should be disgusted and enraged. Yet, that was the exact point of this attack, so it is crucial to keep our heads when analyzing this war.
Let there be no mistake: Hamas is a formidable adversary. They launched the most successful attack in Israeli history. Hamas accomplished what nobody thought was possible: a foreign power controlled parts of Israeli territory. No analogy is perfect, but it would be akin to a Mexican cartel sneaking across the Rio Grande, contesting Brownsville, Texas, while massacring 40,000 Texans and taking thousands hostage.
Let that sink in. It is unfathomable, and our reaction would be ferocious. It would be overwhelming.
Hamas intentionally targeted what remains of the Israeli Left. They attacked a music festival designed to promote peace and harmony. And the attack itself was beyond horrific. There were orgies of violence where Jewish women were raped in front of their friends. By attacking such a symbol of the pro-two-state solution in such a gruesome manner, they all but assured a ferocious response.
Hamas’ goal was to lure the IDF into an unwinnable war of attrition. By doing so, they would show the Middle East that the Jews were not really that strong. They hoped the international outrage would spill into Arab capitals (which it hasn’t), scuttling any rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which was getting close to a history-making peace deal.
October 7th wasn’t some unplanned killing spree. Hamas planned an exceptionally well-executed operation. That’s because they’ve been planning it for possibly over a decade. In 2006, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon pulled Israeli settlers out of Gaza by gunpoint. Then Hamas purged their Palestinian Authority rivals from power, literally throwing them off buildings in broad daylight. Since then, Hamas has likely been preparing for this attack style. That’s not some type of calculated assessment. Again, it’s their stated raison d'etre (edited: good catch JG).
I’ve fought in dangerous locations. My units routinely battled a multifaceted insurgency in the midst of some of Baghdad's most dangerous neighborhoods. Whenever I think of those days, I clench my fist and grit my teeth, and I can taste it all over again. But I’ve never fought an enemy in tunnels. Most Iraq and Afghanistan combat veterans haven’t either, and none of them have fought an enemy with such an extensive and intricate tunnel system. The tunnels are what truly differentiates Hamas from the rest we’ve squared off against over the past twenty years. According to John Spencer, who wrote the book on Urban Warfare, the only parallel is the Battle of Manilla in World War II. In that slugfest, it took 35,000 Americans over a month to defeat 17,000 Japanese, resulting in the death of 100,000 civilians.
Why is the Israeli war taking so long? Those tunnels are the main reason. The Israelis are learning as they go. There is no doctrine to rely on against such an extensive network of tunnels. It is a painstaking, cumbersome process that will continue for months, even after a future Rafah operation.
Hamas’ organizational structure is also different from most Iraq and Afghan groups. They are, in essence, a terror army. Before 7 October, Hamas fielded 24 battalions of fighters, not including fighters from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al-Naser Salah ad-din Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other smaller factions. Hamas is well equipped, organized, and led because, like the pre-9/11 and post-15 Aug 2021 Taliban and the Islamic State at its apex under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, they are the state so that they can extract from a deep reservoir of resources.
Hamas’ cunning operations scored its biggest coup by taking hundreds of hostages. Without them, the IDF would have likely already concluded its large-scale operations. Hamas knows that Israel will stop at nothing to save their people. While the Bowe Bergdahl exchange remains controversial among Afghan veterans, it is nothing compared to previous Israeli-Hamas prisoner exchanges. In 2011, Hamas received 1,027 prisoners, including Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, in exchange for one IDF soldier, Gilad Shilat. Hamas is astutely using this pressure point to slow down the IDF’s operations.
What Hamas has achieved should be appreciated. It has enacted a ruthless strategy that could work. Hamas bested the region’s best intelligence services, the Shin Bet and Mossad, all the while lulling Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu into a sense of overconfidence. They did so partly at the behest of their Iranian sponsor, who may not have explicitly ordered the attack but set all the conditions to make it happen.
Hamas’ cunning strategy must be respected by the West, even if it is despicable. All too often, the United States has rolled its eyes at these groups, only to be humiliated repeatedly. While the United States has failed to learn anything from its failed wars, Israel cannot afford to do that, not after October 7th.
Israel
Before jumping into Israel’s campaign, it’s important to note that they are fighting a multi-front war. Hezbollah has fired thousands of rockets at Israel since October 7th, causing Israel to evacuate over 100,000 people from its northern borders. Daily, the IDF and Hezbollah trade blows. While neither side wants a war, at least right now, that does not mean things won’t spiral out of control.
In the West Bank, terror incidents and attacks continue. Settler attacks have not helped the situation, spurring President Biden’s recent sanctions. Nevertheless, Hamas is surging in popularity in the West Bank, where support for the 7 October attacks remains high. Should the IDF prove successful in Rafah, Hamas could try to incite more attacks to relieve their main force. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is too fragile and corrupt to neutralize such attacks.
Lastly, Israel faces threats from nineteen different Iranian-sponsored groups in Iraq, Syria, and even Yemen. While these Iranian-sponsored groups primarily focus on the United States, they could change their calculus should events on the ground drastically change. What will Iran do if Hamas is on the cusp of military defeat? It’s certainly possible they will escalate the conflict from different proxies to salvage Hamas. In short, while the current fight is centered on Gaza, this conflict will likely expand eventually.
— The War in Gaza —
Israel believes Hamas represents an existential threat. For the first time since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an enemy threatened Israel’s existence as a sanctuary for the Jewish people. The attacks were worse than September 11th, and not just because of the attack’s barbarity. Hamas isn’t in some far-off region like Afghanistan or Iraq. They are right next door, often within miles of Israeli population centers.
Because of the proximity of the threat, Israel has set out on a total war: destroying Hamas military so they can no longer rule Gaza. Some experts have argued for a counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency operation instead of the IDF’s approach. While counterfactuals are impossible to discount, it's hard to fathom how an intelligence community that just recently missed the most significant attack in Israeli history would be able to pivot to counter-terror operations against an enemy hiding underground. Further, a counter-terrorism operation would not have destroyed Hamas's military infrastructure. It just would’ve lopped off a few heads. How that would inevitably lead to Hamas relinquishing control of Gaza is hard to fathom.
Similarly, a population-centric counterinsurgency model is bound to fail since it is unlikely any Hamas replacement would curry favor by allying with Israel. More importantly, Hamas has yet to be defeated. A more enemy-centric counterinsurgency model may work if an insurgency erupts against the eventual ruler (which is almost inevitable). But we are not there yet.
Netanyahu’s ground invasion was the only viable option for achieving his stated war objectives. And, to be clear, his decision to use overwhelming force in a bloody urban war is broadly popular in Israel. That doesn’t mean it is the correct course of action, but it has galvanized an entire nation.
And after six months of grinding operations, the IDF is making progress. They’ve claimed to have killed 13,000 Hamas fighters and have destroyed 19 of its 24 battalions. That means they’ve knocked out approximately 50% of these battalions’ fighting strength. Where did the rest of those fighters go? Many of them went to Rafah, which is why the IDF is adamant about clearing the southern city.
Israel is also starting to put dents in Hamas’ command and control. They recently killed Marwan Issa, Hamas' third-ranking leader, and nearly missed Sinwar, who is hiding behind hostages. They recently killed and captured almost 1,000 Hamas and Palestinian Jihad fighters during an ongoing operation on Al Shifa Hospital. Senior Hamas leaders are reportedly among those captured.
While the IDF’s military operation has been successful, it is not without controversy, primarily due to the high number of “civilian casualties,” a term that takes the humanity out of war. All war is brutal, but urban warfare can be especially savage because terrorists often intentionally stage attacks to maximize the number of dead women, children, and the elderly.
Al Qaeda in Iraq often placed multiple IEDs at an attack site so they could target the first responders, too. I vividly remember the screams of dying Iraqis, gasping for help as they tried to find missing limbs. I remember the puddles of blood. Those screams and images will forever haunt me.
However, the IDF is taking extraordinary measures to protect women, children, and the elderly.
The US military did not take such extensive actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. We usually just dropped leaflets or used government-friendly radio stations to inform the populace. We never telegraphed our punches like the IDF. Not only is the IDF using text messaging, but they are telling the populace the location of future operations by neighborhood.
Nevertheless, there have been tens of thousands of dead women, children, and elderly. While Hamas’ numbers should be ridiculed as preposterous, considering they never distinguish between military members and civilians, it is important not to dismiss the more significant point. Millions of Gazans are trying to survive in a hellish landscape, and thousands have been tragically killed just as Hamas wanted. Nevertheless, while all body count numbers are difficult to gauge, a recent study found that the non-combatant to combatant ratio is 1:4 at max and possibly as low as 1:1. That’s an astonishingly low rate for urban warfare operations in densely populated locations.
Another severe criticism of the IDF’s operations is the lack of humanitarian assistance. The IDF needs to do more to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Gaza. However, it is essential to understand that HA operations are dangerous. I did HA missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I hated them. You’re a sitting duck, and the pucker factor is off the charts. The unit has to maintain a perimeter, protect against attacks, set up a processing system, search local nationals, and remember that hungry people tend to act irrationally. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents often targeted HA missions.
Further, HA missions always aid the enemy, too. Anytime I handed out HA, I knew the insurgents would eventually get their hands on it. It was common to kill Talibs and other insurgents wearing or feeding off of American benevolence. Similarly, HA for Gazans will help feed Hamas fighters, making them more resilient in a grueling war. HA missions must continue, but it is vital to remember that they help the enemy, too. Nevertheless, the IDF and Netanyahu must figure out a better system.
In short, the IDF’s campaign is making steady progress toward its goal of dismantling Hamas. But the biggest problem with the IDF’s war aims is that they are in tension with the second war aim: the return of the hostages. While the destruction of Hamas takes precedence, there is a long Israeli history of hostage families becoming potent political players. Netanyahu must try to retrieve the remaining women and children. But, let there be no mistake: doing this stretches out the conflict, ensuring more civilians and IDF soldiers are killed. In the end, while the return of the hostages is critically important, it should not come at the expense of the destruction of Hamas.
But what comes after Hamas? In short, tell me how this ends.
American combat veterans understand the IDF’s current dilemma. The US struggled mightily with this question in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, a series of weak leaders culminated in Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s disastrous regime, which all but paved the road back for remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which metastasized into the Islamic State. In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani failed to garner widespread support outside of major metropolitan areas, partly due to American incompetence, which helped fuel the Taliban’s ultimate victory.
Although Netanyahu has released general principles for a day after, the devil is in the details. Who is going to administer Gaza? There are no good options. Zero. Israel is loathed to go back into Gaza as an occupying force, contrary to some foolish remarks from despicable elements in Netanyahu’s governing coalition.
Nevertheless, the IDF will take a zero-tolerance approach to Gaza security. Further operations will continue, even after a successful Rafah operation, like its recent raid on the Shifa hospital, for the foreseeable future. They will need to mop up remnants of Hamas.
How long will that phase last? That is very hard to predict, and too many factors are at play, but almost certainly for the remainder of the year–at the minimum. This war will not be over soon, but the most kinetic parts will hopefully be over after Rafah. The United States military learned that lesson in Iraq. In April 2004, President George W. Bush halted the invasion of Fallujah after it started, bending to international pressure. This signal of weakness stiffened the insurgent’s resolve, and the problem only worsened. Finally, a little over six months later, the Marines took Fallujah, which helped see the temporary demise of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Yet that temporary victory was squandered by the Iraqi government and a lack of American resolve. Obama’s 2011 withdrawal from the Iraq forces, which then Vice President Joe Biden supported, helped pave the way to the Islamic State’s victory in Mosul and America’s return three years later. The IDF cannot afford to follow in America’s footsteps. They must defeat the terrorist army at its front door – with overwhelming force and a high body count.
Whoever eventually emerges from Hamas’ ashes will determine the long-term success of Israel in achieving its third goal: ensuring Gaza is not used as a launching point for further attacks. The Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Holocaust denier Abu Mazen, who is currently serving the 18th year of his four-year term, ostensibly governs the West Bank. But the PA is corrupt, weak, and unpopular. Would it gain legitimacy if the IDF simply handed the keys over to them? Probably not.
Yet the PA remains the Biden administration’s top choice for governing Gaza. Netanyahu, who has long viewed the PA as a Trojan horse, remains adamant that the PA cannot rule Gaza. Leading Arab nations have proposed training Palestinian security forces and providing money for reconstruction in return for a pathway to a two-state solution. So far, these countries have rejected Israel’s request that they take responsibility for security in Gaza.
Other options include international peacekeepers or strengthening the weak tribal clans until someone is strong enough to fill the void. Whatever the choice, Israel needs to find better alternatives. A strong local partner could help alleviate much of the misery in Gaza. Should the IDF be successful in Rafah, someone must step into that void and try to put Gaza back on its feet.
– War is Political –
While the United States and Israel both desire the destruction of Hamas, the United States has other priorities, too. The United States Navy is parrying blows with the Houthis to keep vital waterways open. It must also keep Ukraine in the fight, hopefully galvanizing them for a future counter-offensive in 2025. The United States must also prepare for a possible Chinese conflict over Taiwan–and we are woefully unprepared for such a conflict.
President Joe Biden is also up for re-election, and his support for Israel is not popular among his younger, more progressive base. In what is likely to be an incredibly close election, President Biden will need a broad coalition, including Muslims and Jews, to defeat former President Donald Trump.
Biden’s political problems partly explain his increasingly fraught relationship with Netanyahu. Of course, President Biden is in good company in finding Netanyahu maddening. His Israeli political enemies distrust him, as does the majority of Israelis. Much of the Democratic Party despises Netanyahu, too. They remember his frosty relationship with President Obama, specifically Netanyahu’s dramatic speech before Congress. Many Democrats, myself included, thought it would’ve been better for Netanyahu to resign following the October 7 attacks and hand the reigns to someone less divisive. He deserves to walk the plank for simply allowing 7 October to happen.
But I must admit there’s a hefty amount of chutzpah being displayed by segments of the Democratic Party, considering nobody has been held accountable for America’s disastrous defeat in Afghanistan. America’s record on accountability is nowhere near as good as Israel’s.
When Israel loses a war, nobody is spared. Can the United States say the same? No. It cannot.
Further, for all of Netanyahu’s many sins, and there are plenty, I’ve dealt with far worse. I’ve had to partner with Iraqi and Afghan politicians, soldiers, and civilians who killed my brothers-and-sisters-in arms before they switched allegiance. In Kandahar, the district governor I advised was a former mid-level Taliban commander who killed American soldiers. So, I’m not too sympathetic to complaints about Netanyahu.
It’s hard to tell whether Biden and Netanyahu's kerfuffle is real or kabuki theater. I suspect it’s probably a little of both. President Biden will find it nearly impossible to keep Netanyahu from entering Rafah. Netanyahu would not survive politically if he didn’t go in. Israelis are the only ones who can prevent Netanyahu from entering Rafa—and they want him to.
However, it is unclear whether these political attacks are helping or hurting the situation. Most of Bibi’s political rivals came to his defense after Senator Chuck Schumer pleaded with Israelis to replace Netanyahu. It also shows a lack of resolve, which only strengthens Iran’s perceptions of Israel and the United States. While it might be beneficial politically for Biden to lambast Bibi, it will likely only strengthen Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, as he can present himself as the only bulwark against a two-state solution.
Nevertheless, Biden’s support for Israel is unparalleled in recent American history. Which US President has done more for Israel in a time of need? President George W. Bush gave the IDF a little over a month in its 2006 war with Hezbollah. In comparison, President Biden flew to Israel, embraced Netanyahu, and attended a war council meeting. He continues to provide arms to Israel despite facing withering criticism from his left flank. Should Biden lose to Trump in the fall, many Democratic activists will blame Netanyahu, further eroding the party's support for Israel.
It does not help either politician to have a full-blown rupture of relations. For President Biden, it would expose him to further attacks from Republicans that he’s a weak, untrustworthy leader who abandons allies on the battlefield, ala Afghanistan. For Bibi, he would be responsible not only for the worst attack on Israeli soil but also for the rupturing of relations with Israel’s most important ally. That doesn’t mean either of them won’t necessarily do it, but both leaders would face severe repercussions at home if they did.
— Rafah –
The IDF is going into Rafah. There is no stopping them. The images will be heartbreaking. Thousands of women, children, and elderly will be killed. Tragically, this is what Hamas wants. They do not care about their people. They’ve repeatedly shown the world that, even if people refuse to see it. Hopefully, following a successful operation in Rafah, there will be a temporary ceasefire as the IDF moves to phase II operations.
In the long term, Netanyahu may squander the IDF’s military victory with political malpractice like the United States did in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the last twenty years have shown us anything, finding peace is an elusive goal that has bested America’s entire national security state.
The truth is that there is no end to this. The fighting will continue for the foreseeable future. Until the Palestinians realize that the Israelis are not leaving, then their support for these groups will continue unabated. Dreams for a two-state solution – and that’s what they are, dreams–are dead on arrival. Israelis will not support it, not until they feel more secure.
Once Hamas is defeated militarily, Israel is almost certainly to turn its gaze toward its northern neighbor, Hezbollah. Israel can no longer afford to live with them so close to their borders. That future conflict will make the Gaza War seem tame in comparison.
If we are lucky, that might not happen for a few years, but it will likely occur. In short, the IDF’s campaign will likely achieve most of its aims. They will continue conducting operations for the foreseeable future in Gaza and try to find a reasonable partner to administer this small piece of land. However, the landscape of the Middle East will continue to feel the repercussions of Hamas’ stunning achievement. It will get worse before it gets better.
It takes strength to write about this topic. As usual with all things Middle East, I have no answers. Yet, it is a situation that affects us no doubt, so people who think we should leave it alone are mistaken.
There is one thing I'm curious about, and that is Netanyahu. In the press, I sense a view from somewhere that if Hamas did not attack, Netanyahu would be practically headed to prison. He gets likened to Trump in this way, but I do not know that to be true. I've long been like this with the mainstream press - not enough info for me to make a decision.
Great article. What a mess but you describe the situation with great clarity. I now have a much better understanding of the stakes in this war and where it is headed. Thanks very much.