On America's Monster

Thoughts on Raziq

Howdy,

Gotta hand it to the New York Times; they decided five years after the Taliban killed Kandahar “Chief of Police” Abdul Raziq was the perfect time to drop a very long piece on him and how he supposedly was enigmatic of America’s failed misadventure in Afghanistan.

You should read the whole thing, but here’s the crucial part:

His battlefield prowess was built on years of torture, extrajudicial killings, and the largest-known campaign of forced disappearances during America’s 20-year war in Afghanistan, a New York Times investigation into thousands of cases during his rule found.

The Times obtained hundreds of pages of documents written by the former American-backed government, more than a decade’s worth of hidden ledgers bearing clues to his campaign of abuse. He transformed the police into a fearsome combat force without constraints, and his officers abducted hundreds, if not thousands, of people to be killed or tortured in secret jails, The Times found. Most were never seen again.

The culture of lawlessness and impunity he created flew in the face of endless promises by American presidents, generals and ambassadors to uphold human rights and build a better Afghanistan.

And it helps explain why the United States lost the war.

The New York Times misses the forest for the trees. But it does that often. Yes, he was a monster but compared to who? The Taliban? Please. The Haqqani Network? Get out. The Islamic State? Not even close.

I’m not sure why they needed to do this big story, considering the Taliban makes Raziq seem like a choir boy. Still, I guess revisiting something everyone already understood is newsworthy. My guess is they are trying to lay the foundation for defending Biden in Afghanistan. Maybe I’m wrong.

I knew General Raziq reasonably well. In 2012, he visited my little Village Stability Platform in Ghorak, Kandahar. He was greeted like a rock star. Never before and never since have I seen an Afghan receive that type of support.

I hung out with him for a bit. We would later talk more extensively when I returned in 2014.

Now, did he run drugs? Yep. Did he murder, torture, and disappear people? You got it. Did everyone know this? Yes, they sure did.

So why did we “support him”?

First, Raziq didn’t just magically appear before our eyes. Instead, he rose through the corrupt Afghan Border Police, helping control narcotic traffic and wrestling that money from the Taliban’s hands. He commanded loyalty from his troops, who were better equipped and trained than most Afghan police officers. He wasn’t just some dope we found on the corner. Anyway, he did have charisma and was very cunning. These are necessary qualities for any successful wartime leader.

Second, the war in southern Afghanistan was mismanaged from the get-go. Before Raziq, there was the Bulldozer, Gul Agha Sherzai. I met Gul Agha a handful of times during my time downrange. He was a fucking hoot! Out of the countless murderers, rapists, drug kingpins, and sodomists I’ve dined with, he’s probably one of my favorites! He played Americans like a fine-tuned fiddle. America’s Special Operation Forces loved them some Bulldozer. He reminded me of Jabba the Hut.

Third, when you’re getting shot at, you tend to find the first person who won’t shoot at you and join forces with them. That’s just a fact of war. Sometimes, they turn out to be wonderful people. Often, however, they’re monsters in your eyes. But, in reality, you find a way to work together for a common goal. We did it with Stalin in World War II and countless other wars.

Should we have partnered with Raziq, the Bulldozer, or my ATF Habib Afghan (he was from northern Kapisa, IFYKYK)? I don’t know. It depends on what we were trying to do, and we never quite figured that out. That’s an interesting debate I’ll save for another day.

My biggest problem with the piece is that the New York Times treats it like some big story. Bruh, people were reporting about it in 2011. I bring that up because, in the story, they hilariously bill it as “When the US pulled out of Afghanistan, it left its secrets in the desert.”

Huh?

Secret? Bruh, EVERYONE knew that.

Oh, I mean everyone but the people at home, perhaps?

Again, I’m happy to discuss Raziq, Dostum, Noor, etc. There should be a healthy debate about the people we ally with, but remember: your allies aren’t made in a hermetically sealed laboratory. Often, you get what’s closest to you.

Ain’t war fun?

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Speaking of WAR. I wrote a little something in the Long War Journal today. Here’s a snippet:

The Taliban is fighting to squash a multi-faceted resistance that is gaining strength, but the movement spearheaded by the National Resistance Front (NRF) is still too nascent to pose a threat to the Taliban’s rule. While the Taliban faces internal rifts and attacks from other radical Islamic terrorist groups, like the Islamic State, it is essential to remember that the anti-Taliban resistance groups also face a similar kaleidoscope of threats on an ever-evolving battlefield.

We’re going to write a lot about the anti-Taliban resistance. Because of all of Raziq’s many faults, he was way better than the Taliban. We mustn’t forget who our real enemies are.

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I also appeared on the Afghanistan Project Podcast yesterday with the GOAT, Beth Bailey. We talk about my former combat interpreter Ahmadullah and also the latest with Colonel Nazir.

Tomorrow, inshallah, Stories From My Brothers: Tales of the Afghan Security Forces should hit the airwaves.

Please give it a listen. You can watch a clip below.

(I know I have to work on some of the editing skills, but we’re learning as fast as possible!)

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